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This paper re-examines the impact that paying interest on reserves has on price level indeterminacy,
price level volatility, and overall economic well-being. Unlike previous papers which examined these
issues, the model developed in this paper allows the return on reserves to equal the return on
government securities, which is less than the prevailing return on storage. Equally important, this
model also considers how deﬁcit ﬁnancing changes the impact that paying interest on reserves has
on the economy. I show that the number of steady state equilibria are equal to, or greater than,
the number that arise when no interest is paid on reserves. In other words, the level of economic
indeterminacy is equal to or greater than in an economy without interest payments. When the
level of indeterminacy is the same, then economic volatility is reduced with the introduction of
interest payments. However, when there exists greater indeterminacy in the interest-on-reserves
economy, then there also exists greater volatility. In addition, under certain conditions, paying
interest on reserves can be welfare enhancing. When it is not, an appropriate expansionary open
market operation can oﬀset the welfare losses associated with interest payments. Finally, under a
narrow set of conditions, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic may obtain.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The issue of paying interest on reserves is not new and was introduced by Milton Friedman almost
ﬁfty years ago in A Program for Monetary Stability.1 Friedman’s original motivation was to make
the 100% reserve requirement of the “Chicago Plan” more palatable to a banking system subject
to only a fractional reserve system. The goal of the Chicago Plan and the proposal to pay interest
on reserves was to establish greater price level stability and to reduce excessive ﬂuctuations in the
price level.
There has been considerable research regarding the implications of paying interest on reserves.2
Three studies in particular, Sargent and Wallace (1985), Smith (1991), and Freeman and Haslag
(1996), have examined in some detail whether Freidman’s proposal would bring about the desired
reductions in price level indeterminacy and volatility. In addition, these papers examined the
welfare implications of switching from a system of not paying interest on reserves to one which
did.3 While the research cited above improved our understanding of those conditions under which
paying interest will produce more or less economic volatility and greater welfare, it suﬀered from
two speciﬁc limitations. First, it did not allow for multiple assets in a meaningful way. Second, it
assumed that either the government ran a balanced budget or had a surplus.
These are important limitations. A lack of multiple assets results in the return on money
balances (reserves) being equated to the return on storage (capital). Because storage is the only
other asset and its return invariant, its real world counterpart would be the average long-term
1It was not until recently, however, that Congress has perennially introduced legislation which would allow the
Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserves. Although this legislation has yet to pass, it has the support of many
diﬀerent constituencies, including the Federal Reserve itself. In particular see the recent testimony before Congress
given by Kohn (2004) and the prior testimony by Meyer (2001).
2The focus of these studies fall broadly into three categories: the use of interest payments on reserves strictly as
a policy tool, the role of paying interest on reserves on payment services policies, and the impact of this policy on
general welfare, price level determinacy, and economic stability relative to the current system.
See Woodford (2003), Goodfriend (2002), Hall (2002), and Goodhart (2000), for examples of papers which examine
the use of paying interest of reserves as an instrument of monetary policy. In particular, these papers discuss the role
of paying interest on reserves in implementing monetary policy in a world without money or where the zero bound
on interest rates is binding. See Toma (1999) and Lacker (1997) for discussions of interest on reserve payments in
terms of the Fed’s role as a clearinghouse for settlement of private payment systems.
3Sargent and Wallace (1985) highlighted two key facts. First, paying interest on reserves, combined with a 100%
reserve requirement, would not necessarily lead to a deterministic price level and less ﬂuctuations. Second, the
method of ﬁnancing interest payments could lead to real diﬀerences in economic outcomes. Smith (1991) showed that
if the rate of return on reserves were tied to productive investment technologies, then the indeterminacies described in
Sargent and Wallace (1985) disappear. However, interest ﬁnanced via taxes resulted in a series of oscillating equilibria,
and thus, might actually lead to greater economic ﬂuctuations than when interest was not paid. In addition, Smith
(1991) showed that there was no clear cut welfare justiﬁcation for paying interest on reserves. Finally, Freeman and
Haslag (1996) explored means by which paying interest on reserves could be Pareto improving. They showed that
if an appropriate, accommodative open market operation was undertaken, then the initial old generation will be
indiﬀerent, while all future generations are better-oﬀ. See Guzman (2004) for a more in-depth review of these three
papers.
1return on capital. However, Friedman’s proposal was for reserves to oﬀer a return equal to that of
short-term government bonds.4 The fundamental idea here is that the return on reserves should
be equal to the return on assets with similar maturity and risk structures.
In the previous literature, how interest payments were ﬁnanced crucially impacted the likelihood
for volatility to arise. However, this literature assumed that the budegt was either balanced or in
surplus. This ignores the impact that deﬁcit ﬁnancing has on both the means for ﬁnancing interest
payments and also on the complications that arise from simultaneously attempting to ﬁnance a
deﬁcit and ﬁx the real return on reserves. If the total sum of expenditures, interest paid on bond
holdings, and interest paid on reserve balances exceeds tax revenue, then the role of ﬁnancing
interest payments on reserves via taxes or earnings on assets is not relevant. The appropriate
concern now becomes how the mix of additional bond and money issues impacts the economy when
the government simultaneously ties the return on reserves to other assets, such as bonds.
The goal of this paper is to correct for the two omissions cited above and to re-examine the
impact of switching from a system where reserves earn no interest to one where they do. More
speciﬁcally, I study the issues of indeterminacy of equilibria, economic volatility, and welfare gains
in an economy where interest is paid on reserves. This is done in the context of a two period
overlapping generations model with multiple assets and a government deﬁc i tt h a tm u s tb eﬁnanced
with either debt or seigniorage.
I am particularly interested in addressing three questions. First, in the presence of a government
deﬁcit and a return on storage that dominates all other rates of return, does paying interest on
reserves reduce potential indeterminacy of equilibria? Second, under the same conditions does the
amount of economic volatility increase or decrease? Third, are there any welfare justiﬁcations for
switching to a system where reserves earn interest, without accompanying open market operations
by the central bank? In addition, if paying interest on reserves is not welfare improving, then
are the results of Freeman and Haslag (1996), namely that an accompanying, expansionary open
market operation can provide a welfare justiﬁcation, also relevant to this model? Finally, given
the presence of both debt and seigniorage in ﬁnancing of the deﬁcit, does unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic arise?
The key ﬁndings of this paper can be easily summarized as follows. When there exists an after-
tax government deﬁcit and reserves are paid a rate of return equal to that of bonds (and less than
4See Friedman (1960, Chapter 3, p75) for the lone paragraph devoted to the appropriate choice of the rate of
return to be paid on reserve holdings.
2the return on storage), the number of steady state equilibria (in terms of real money balances)
are equal to, or greater than, the number that arise when no interest is paid on reserves. Thus,
the level of economic indeterminacy is equal to or greater than in an economy without interest
payments. This runs counter to what Friedman had envisioned and the results of Smith (1991).
Second, when the number of steady state equilibria are the same in the interest and non-interest
economies (i.e., the level of indeterminacy is equal), then economic volatility is reduced with the
introduction of interest payments. However, when greater indeterminacy in the interest-on-reserves
economy exists, then there also exists greater volatility.
Third, when there exists multiple (two) equilibria in both economies, then the equilibrium
associated with low real money balances in the interest economy is welfare improving compared
t ot h en o n - i n t e r e s te c o n o m y . T h er e v e r s ei st r u e at the high real money balance equilibrium.
In this case, an appropriate expansionary open market operation can oﬀset the welfare losses
associated with interest payments on reserves. In addition, when there exists a unique steady state
equilibrium in the non-interest bearing economy, then there is always a welfare loss associated
with paying interest on reserves. In this case onem a yn o tb ea b l et om i t i g a t et h ew e l f a r el o s s
by undertaking appropriate open market operations. Finally, under a narrow set of conditions,
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic may arise in steady state equilbrium.
The basic intuition behind these results is as follows. The government, in either economy, faces
simultaneous, competing decisions that it must make regarding ﬁnancing its deﬁcit. It must decide
which instruments to use, and their relative quantities, to ﬁnance its deﬁcit while at the same time
supplying quantities that are consistent with individual’s wanting to hold all assets in equilibrium
(i.e., no asset can have a negative return). Once it has decided the mix of money and bonds needed
to ﬁnance its deﬁcit, it must then choose between using a small seigniorage tax base and large
seigniorage tax rate, or vice versa. This latter consideration gives rise to a Laﬀer curve and in its
simplest case, two steady state equilibria.
However, in the economy with interest payments on reserves, because the returns on real bal-
ances are tied to the returns on bond holdings, this eﬀectively constrains the range of the seigniorage
tax base which is consistent with ﬁnancing a given deﬁcit. Thus, the set of real money balances
which are consistent with equilibrium are smaller in the presence of interest payments on reserves.
As a result, when there exist two equilibria in both economies, the variance (and hence volatility)
of steady state outcomes will be less in the economy with interest payments.
In some instances it will be the case that when no interest is paid on reserves, some real money
3balances consistent with supporting a given deﬁcit would result in negative returns on assets and
thus not all assets would be held. These money balances are obviously not consistent with equilib-
rium. In this case, while there might be two candidate steady state levels of real money balances,
only the larger one is consistent with ﬁnancing the deﬁcit without violating the requirement that
assets earn a non-negative return. This situation, of a unique steady state equilibrium, is more
likely to occur in the non-interest economy since the set of real money balances which could poten-
tially support a given deﬁcit is larger for the non-interest economy. Thus, under certain parameter
settings, the interest economy will have two steady state equilibria while the non-interest economy
only one. Obviously, in this case, both the level of indeterminacy and volatility will be greater on the
interest bearing economy. Finally, under certain assumptions, the economies are both Samuelson-
case economies where savings (and hence consumption) are strictly increasing in the level of real
money balances. Thus, since the seigniorage tax base is larger in the non-interest economy, the
steady state equilibrium values of real balances are higher (and lower when two equilibria exists)
than those of the corresponding interest economy.
The basic economic model used in this paper is a variation of Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and
simply augments it with interest payments on reserves. The structure of the economy is as follows.
The economy consists of an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations, where
individuals across generations are identical in all dimensions. Consumers are endowed each period
with a given amount of a consumption good which they either consume or invest. Individuals
may invest their saving in any of three diﬀerent assets. There is a storage technology, which pays
the highest rate of return, government bonds, and money, whose return is dominated by all other
assets. It is assumed that individuals cannot invest directly in the storage technology and that
all investment in storage must be intermediate and is subject to a reserve requirement. Required
reserves pay a rate of return equal to that of government securities. Thus, individuals save by
purchasing bonds and depositing their savings with intermediaries.
In addition, there exists a government which must ﬁnance a constant per capita after-tax deﬁcit
while also paying interest on bonds and reserves. This deﬁcit and interest payments are funded
by some combination of money creation and new debt oﬀerings. Finally, it is assumed that the
government conducts policy by choosing (once and for all in the ﬁrst period) a ratio of bonds to
currency. Variations in this ratio can be thought of as permanent open market operations.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy, while
Section 3 states conditions necessary for steady state equilibrium exist. The propensity for un-
4pleasant monetarist arithmetic to arise is also discussed in this section. A comparison of steady
state equilibria, of the issue of price determinacy and volatility, and of economic welfare between
an economy without interest payments and one with interest payments are the topics of Section 4.
Section 5 concludes and all proofs can be found in the Appendices.
2 The Model
The economy consists of an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations, along
with an initial old generation. Time is discrete and indexed by t =1 ,2,... At every date t an e w
generation, comprised of N identical members, is born. There exists a government that has a
constant per capita real expenditure level of g>0 in each period. The government levies no direct
taxes, and so it must ﬁnance its deﬁcit by issuing money and bonds.5 Let Mt denote the per capita
stock of money outstanding at the end of period t,a n dBt denote the outstanding per capita supply
of bonds (in nominal terms). All bonds are of one-period maturity, and are default free.
2.1 Consumers
Individuals are endowed with some of a single, non-produced good, which can either be consumed
or stored. The endowment of a representative individual is given by ω1 > 0 when young and by
ω2 ≥ 0 when old. In addition, members of the initial old are each endowed with ω0 ≥ 0 units
of consumption, and with M0 > 0 units of ﬁat currency. Consumption of a representative agent
born at t is denoted by ct
t when young and ct







,w h e r eU is assumed to be strictly increasing in each argument, to be twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, and to be strictly quasi-concave.6
Young individuals can either store their endowment, sell it to old individuals in exchange for
money, or sell it to the government in exchange for either money or bonds. All individuals are
assumed to have access to a non-stochastic, constant returns to scale technology for storing their
endowment. In particular, one unit stored at date t returns R>1 units of consumption at date
t +1 .7 Let kt denote the amount that an individual chooses to store at date t. In addition, let pt
5Alternatively, one could imagine that the government levies some (ﬁxed) lump-sum taxes. Then one would
interpret the endowments received by individuals, ω1and ω2, as after-tax endowments, and g as the deﬁcit. In much
of the literature, for example Smith (1991), Freeman and Haslag (1996), and Sargent and Wallace (1985) how the
interest payments on reserves is ﬁnanced is important to the outcome. However, given a positive after-tax per capita
deﬁcit implies that the ﬁnancing scheme will not be important.
6The initial old, of course, value only old age consumption and desire as much of it as possible.
7I fp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hw e r ea l l o w e d ,t h e nt h ec o n d i t i o nt h a tR exceeds one plus the rate of population growth
5denote the time t price level, let zt denote the holdings of real balances by a young individual at
t,a n dl e tbt denote real bond holdings by a representative young agent at t. It is assumed that
storage is subject to a reserve requirement,
zt ≥ λkt, (1)
and that the government pays a gross rate of return xt+1 in period t +1on the nominal balances
w h i c hw e r eo b t a i n e di np e r i o dt. In addition to this reserve requirement, each young individual
faces the following budget constraints at t:
ct
t + zt + kt + bt ≤ ω1 (2)
ct






where ρt+1 is the gross real rate of return on government bonds between t and t +1 .












holds, then the reserve requirement is binding, and equation (1) holds as an equality. This situation
is focused on throughout, in which case one can transform the young individuals’ problem as follows.
Let dt ≡ kt + zt =( 1+λ)kt denote storage plus reserves, which will be referred to as “deposits.”
In addition, let φ ≡ 1
1+λ,w h e r eφ denotes the fraction of deposits held in the form of storage,
and 1 − φ can be thought of as the fraction of deposits required to be held as reserves. With this









t + dt + bt ≤ ω1 (5)
ct
t+1 ≤ ω2 +
∙





dt + ρt+1bt (6)
would need to be imposed.
6Obviously, if bonds and deposits are both to be held,





; t ≥ 1 (7)
must hold. The right hand side of equation (7) is simply the weighted return on a portfolio consisting
of storage and currency, with 1 − φ being the portfolio weight attached to currency. Equation (7)
then requires that the return on government bonds equal the appropriately weighted return on
storage and currency, which is – in eﬀect – the rate of return on deposits. Finally, in keeping
with Friedman’s original idea that the rate of return on reserves be equal to the short-term yield
on government securities, it is assumed that ρt+1 = xt+1.8 Thus equation (7)can be rewritten as
ρt+1 =
φR




´ ; t ≥ 1. (8)
When equation (8) holds, the problem confronting young individuals can be even further simpli-
ﬁed. Let St denote total savings by a young individual at t : i.e., St ≡ dt +bt. Then this individual
c a nb ev i e w e da sc h o o s i n gSt to maximize U
£









ω1 − St,ω2 + ρt+1St
¤
, (9)
then the function S summarizes an individuals’s optimal savings behavior. The following conditions
on S are assumed to hold throughout the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 1 For all dates t ≥ 1, the function S satisﬁes
S [min{φR,1}] ≥ 0. (A.1)
Assumption 2 For all dates t ≥ 1, the function S satisﬁes
S0(ρ) > 0, ∀ρ>0. (A.2)
Assumption (A.1) implies that S(1) ≥ 0 holds, rendering this a “Samuelson case” economy, and
(A.2) asserts that savings are increasing in the rate of return, thereby ruling out “large” income
8See section 2.1.1 for a discussion of the interpretation of equating the return on nominal money balances to the
real return on bond holdings.
7eﬀects.9 Finally, Assumption (A.1) implies that φ ≥ S−1(0)/R must be satisﬁed; in eﬀect this
imposes an upper bound on the level of the reserve requirement. When this bound is in eﬀect,
individuals are willing to save non-negative amount s ,r e g a r d l e s so ft h er a t eof return on reserves.
2.1.1 Remarks
Some aspects of the individual’s problem described above would beneﬁt from great explanation.
With respect to how reserve requirements are modeled, equation (1) is meant to be interpreted as a
conventional reserve requirement. Consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (1998), Espinosa-Vega and
Russell (1998), and Wallace (1984), individuals can be thought of as not being allowed to store their
own goods. In other words, all storage must be intermediate, where intermediaries are required to
hold a fraction of deposits – equal to 1−φ – in the form of cash reserves. If there is free entry into
intermediation, intermediaries will earn zero proﬁts and hold a portfolio maximizing the utility of a
representative depositor. In this case, equations (1)-(3) simply represent the consolidated balance
sheets of banks and individuals.10
The deﬁnition and interpretation of the interest rate paid on reserves, xt+1 also deserves further
attention. While Friedman (1960) does not spend a great deal of time discussing how to set the
interest rate on reserves, he does brieﬂy suggest that a viable option would be to set the rate
equal to the average yield on short-term government bonds from the previous few quarters.11 As a
practical matter, it was suggested that this be done on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. Consistent
with, although not identical to, this suggestion and the idea that the rate of return on reserves
should be equal to the rate prevailing on assets of a similar maturity and risk level, in this model
the return on nominal money holdings, xt+1, has been equated with the real return on bonds, ρt+1.
The basic idea is that the monetary authority can set the rate of return on nominal reserves, but
because the government can ﬁnance its after-tax deﬁcit with either seigniorage or debt, the central
bank cannot control the real return on reserves with certainty. Thus, how the government chooses
to ﬁnance its debt will determine the extent to which the real return on reserves is close to the real
9See Gale (1973).
10It should also be noted that it has been assumed that bond-holders do not face a reserve requirement. See
comments throughout Bhattacharya et al. (1998) about the impact on the basic model when interest is not paid on
reserves.
11See Friedman (1961, chapter 3, p75) for the lone paragraph devoted to the appropriate choice of the rate of return
to be paid on reserve holdings.
8return on bonds.12,13
2.1.2 The Government
T h eg o v e r n m e n tm u s tﬁnance a real per capita deﬁcit of g each period through the issue of money




+ bt − ρtbt−1 −
xtMt−1
pt
; ∀t ≥ 1 (10)
Equation (10) asserts that the real value of money created in period t, (Mt − Mt−1)/pt,p l u st h e
real value of the bonds sold at that date, bt, must equal the real value of the government budget
deﬁcit, g, plus the interest obligations on outstanding government debt, ρtbt−1 and the interest
obligations associated with reserves, xtMt−1 /pt. It is assume that the government conducts policy




; t ≥ 1 (11)
of bonds to currency. Variations in µ can be thought of as permanent open market operations.14
In addition, the government sets the reserve requirement 1−φ. The initial level of the money stock
must satisfy M0 > 0 and B0 =0is assumed to be given as initial conditions.
Substituting equations (7), (11), and zt ≡ Mt /pt = λkt =( 1 − φ)dt in equation (10), it is
possible to rewrite the government budget constraint as15

















; t ≥ 2. (12)
12This is in contrast to Sargent and Wallace (1985), Smith (1991), and Freeman and Haslag (1996), where there
was only one asset, equivalent to the storage technology in this paper, to which the return on reserves was equalized.
Although the two-period nature of the model does not allow short and long term rates (in the true sense of Friedman’s
proposal), the multiple asset aspect does allow for setting the return on reserves to a rate less than that obtained by
storage (or capital).
13An alternative interpretation would be that xt+1 represents the real return on real money balances, zt, in terms
of the period t price level. In aﬀect, the central bank would pay interest on reserves at the end of period t, based on
the real balances possessed by individuals at the end of the period. Equating xt+1 to the real return on bonds that
individuals will receive at the beginning of next period implies that the only costs associate with holding reserves is
that associated with the government ﬁnancing their deﬁcit via seigniorage.
14Note that this deﬁnition of an open market operation diﬀers from that in Freeman and Haslag (1996). Here it
represents a shift in the composition of deﬁcit ﬁnancing instruments. In Freeman and Haslag (1996) it amounted to
a purchase of an asset which was used to reduce the funds the bank needed to acquire to pay interest on reserves.
15The initial, t =1 , government budget constraint is (1+µ)z1 = g+(1+x1)M0/p1. Once z1 and x1 are determined,
then this government budget constraint gives us the initial price level.
9Equation (12) can be interpreted as the government must issue enough liabilities at t, zt + bt =
(1 + µ)zt,t oﬁnance its current deﬁcit plus the implied interest obligation on its inherited liabilities.
3 Equilibrium
In order for equilibrium to obtain, consumers must be maximizing their utility and the government
budget constraint must hold. The ﬁrst condition requires that the quantity of savings demanded
must equal the quantity supplied. Given the deﬁnition of zt,w h e r ezt ≡ Mt /pt is the real value





must hold in equilibrium. In addition,
the supply of government bonds plus deposits must equal the savings of young individuals. Thus
















; t ≥ 1. (13)







, and substituting the result into
equation (12) yields the equilibrium law of motion for per capita real balances:












































gives the equilibrium rate of return on government bonds, while for
















describes the gross rate of return on real balances (the inverse of the gross rate of inﬂation.)
There are, of course, a number of conditions that an equilibrium sequence {zt} must satisfy.
First, it must satisfy (14) at each date. Second, zt ≥ 0 ∀t ≥ 1 must also hold. Third, given the
method of derivation, the reserve requirement must be binding at each date. And, ﬁnally, equation










<R ; t ≥ 1 (16)
Equations (14), (16), and zt ≥ 0 constitute our equilibrium conditions.
3.1 Steady State Equilibria
Attention will now be turned to ascertaining the conditions under which there exist steady state
equilibria. Setting zt−1 = zt in equation (14) and rearranging terms, one obtains the following






















Deﬁne H (z,µ,φ,R) by




















The function H (z,µ,φ,R) describes how much revenue – net of interest obligations – the gov-
ernment can raise in a steady state equilibrium if the per capita level of real balances is z,t h e
bond-money ratio is µ, and the reserve requirement is 1−φ.I ns u c ha ne q u i l i b r i u m ,o fc o u r s e ,t h e
quantity of revenue raised must equal the government budget deﬁcit g. However, in order for z to
constitute a steady state equilibrium level of real balances, z must satisfy not only (17), but (16)
as well.
To ascertain the conditions under which steady state equilibria exist, as well as their number, it
will be useful to know more about the function H. Its properties are stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (a) H (z,µ,φ,R)=0holds iﬀ z =0or
z = z† ≡ S
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


























⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬












Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix A. For simplicity of exposition the following assumption is made
11Assumption 3 For all values of µ, φ, R and 0 ≤ z ≤ z†,
H11 (z,µ,φ,R) < 0. (A.3)
Thus, H (z,µ,φ,R) is a concave function of z. The consequences of relaxing this assumption will
be discussed later.
Under Assumptions (A.1)-(A.3), equation (18) has the conﬁguration depicted in Figure 1. Any
values of z satisfying equation (18) are candidate steady state equilibria. As shown in the ﬁgure,
if there are any such candidates, there will generically be exactly two.16 Let z− denote the steady
state with lower real balance holdings and z+ the steady state with higher holdings. As is evident
from Figure 1 the lower level of real balance holdings occurs on the “bad” side of the Laﬀer curve
and the higher level on the “good” side: i.e., H1 (z−,µ,φ) > 0 >H 1 (z+,µ,φ) must hold.












We can now state the following result, which is proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 2 Suppose that
1 ≥ µ(φR − 1) (A.4)











For the remainder of the paper Assumptions (A.4) is assumed to hold. In which case only the left-
hand constraint in equation (16) can bind on the determination of a steady state equilibrium. There
are three possibilities regarding whether z− and z+ constitute legitimate steady state equilibria.





≤ z−, then there are two genuine steady state equilibria.
16If Assumption (A.3) is relaxed, there can be more than two candidate steady states. In general, these equilibria
will occur in pairs.
17Assumption (A.4) holds for all values of µ if φR ≤ 1. For an economy with a reserve requirement of 10 percent
(φ =0 .9), this condition will be satisﬁed if there is no asset with a safe, real rate of return in excess of 11.11 percent,
which certainly seems empirically plausible. Of course if φR > 1 holds, then Assumption (A.4) places an upper
bound on µ. In the third quarter of 2004, the outstanding gross public debt of the U.S. was $7.38 trillion, while the
monetary base was about $749 billion. Thus, for the U.S., µ ≈ 9.85. In this case, Assumption (A.4) would hold so
long as φR < 1.102.





≤ z+, then only z− constitutes a legitimate steady state
equilibrium. Thus, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium.





, then there does not exists any steady state equilibria.
Obviously this last case is not of particular interest, and thus remainder of the paper will focus
on cases 1 and 2, which are represented by Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. An examination
of the ﬁgures will indicate that case 1 is most likely to obtain for large values of g (given µ and
φ), while case 2 must obtain for suﬃciently small values of g (again, for given choices of µ and φ).
Thus, to reiterate, for suﬃciently small but positive values of g (where small means relative to µ
and φ), there will exist a unique steady state equilibrium. This is true even though the function
H (z,µ,φ,R) exhibits all of the standard properties that give rise to “Laﬀer curve” phenomenon.
The possibility that there is a unique steady state equilibrium, even in the presence of a Laﬀer
curve, is a consequence of the binding reserve requirement faced by “depositors.”
Finally, before comparing steady state equilibria with and without interest payments on reserves,
it will be useful to examine the impact of open market operations on equilibrium values as well as
whether unpleasant monetarist arithmetic obtains.
3.2 Comparative Statics
Of particular interest is how changes in the bond-money ratio, µ,a ﬀect the steady state equilibrium
level(s) of real balances, and the rate of inﬂation. An increase in µ corresponds to a (permanently)
higher bond-money ratio, and hence to a contractionary open market operation, as conventionally
deﬁned.





= −H2 (z,µ,φ.R). (20)
The following lemma (which is proved in Appendix C) is now established.
Lemma 3 Suppose that φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] >S −1 ¡
z†¢
holds, then H2 (z+,µ,φ,R) < 0 and
∂z+ /∂µ < 0.
Lemma 3 asserts that under certain conditions, namely the return on bonds cannot be too large
relative to the return on storage for a given reserve requirement, a contractionary open market
13operation necessarily reduces z+.18 Finally, what one would ultimately like to know is the eﬀect of
a change in µ on the steady state rate of return on real balances or, in other words, on the inverse
inﬂation rate pt /pt+1 . Appendix D establishes the following proposition.















If φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] >S −1 ¡
z†¢
holds, as in Lemma 3, then ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂µ < 0. When H1 (z,µ,φ,R) <
0 and ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂µ > 0 then H1 (z,µ,φ,R) > 0.
Proposition 1 states the familiar result about the “Laﬀer curve” and “unpleasant monetarist arith-
metic.” Under the conditions necessary for Lemma 3 to hold, ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂µ increases on the
upward sloping portion of H (z,µ,φ,R), while decreasing on the downward sloping portion. Thus,
a contractionary open market operation raises the steady state rate of inﬂa t i o no nt h e“ g o o d - s i d e ”o f
the Laﬀer curve and lowers inﬂation on the “bad-side.” Consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (1998),
this result does not require that ρ exceed the steady state rate of growth. All that is needed is for
some asset whose real rate of return exceeds the economy’s long-run rate of growth exist (in the
model R>1.) The unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is the result of ρ>x t+1pt /pt+1 holding. In
this case, an increase in the bond-money ratio substitutes a more expensive for a less expensive
ﬁnancing instrument. Consequently, heavier use must be made of the inﬂation tax.19 Finally, it
should also be noted the set of interest rates, ρ, for which unpleasant monetarist arithmetic arises
is potentially smaller when interest is paid on reserves than when it is not.20 T h u s ,i ti sl e s sl i k e l y
to occur when the return on real balances is more closely tied to the real return on bonds.
Of course these remarks apply to candidate steady state equilibria [that is, to values of z
satisfying equation (17)]. However, in this environment not all candidate steady state equilibria
necessarily satisfy equation (16), and hence not all values of z satisfying equation (17) constitute
legitimate steady states. There are two cases to consider in this respect.
18Based on Lemma 3 nothing deﬁnitive can be said as the what happens to z
− : it may rise or fall. In addition,




, when H1 (z,µ,φ,R) < 0 it will be the case that
H2 (z,µ,φ,R) < 0.
19See Bhattacharya et al. (1998) for a more in-depth explanation of this result and also a discussion of the likelihood
that it applies to the United States.








, then it would be the case that ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂µ > 0





φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] then the results of Proposition 1 are reversed. This is in contrast to the non-interest bearing
economy where unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is always present at the high real money balance steady state.





≤ z−, both before and after the change in µ.





≤ z+, both before and after the change in µ.
In Case 4, z− and z+ are both legitimate steady state equilibria. The high real balance steady
state is easily shown to be Pareto superior to the low real balance steady state. When Case
5 obtains there is a unique steady state equilibrium (z+). If Lemma 3 holds, then unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic prevails at the high real money balance equilibrium and contractionary open
market activity must lead to a higher steady state inﬂation rate.
4 Comparison to Non-Interest Environment
It will now be useful to compare the steady state results in the interest-on-reserves economy to the
case where interest is not paid on reserves. This latter case is described in detail in Bhattacharya
et al. (1998), and hence only the results are presented here. However, as will be noted by the
similarity to the results from this paper, the derivations of the non-interest results is completely
analogous to the derivation of results in this paper.
When interest is not paid on reserves, then the consumer’s budget constraints and the govern-
ment’s budget constraint are given by
ct
t + dt + bt ≤ ω1
ct
t+1 ≤ ω2 +
∙










+ bt − ρtbt−1 ; ∀t ≥ 1,























which is very similar to equation (18). Equation (22) has the same basic hump shape as equation
(18), and thus it remains to establish their relative positions. The following proposition states the
relationship between H (z,µ,φ,R) and HNI(z,µ,φ,R).
15Proposition 2 For z =0 , then H (0,µ,φ,R)=HNI(0,µ,φ,R). For all z>0, then H (z,µ,φ,R) <
HNI(z,µ,φ,R).
The proof of this proposition follows from a straight foward comparison of H (z,µ,φ,R) and
HNI(z,µ,φ,R) and application of previous assumptions, and hence the proof is omitted. Figure 3
provides a generalized illustration of the relative positions of H (z,µ,φ,R) and HNI(z,µ,φ,R).
4.1 Deﬁcits and Inﬂation
The ﬁrst thing to note is that for a given bond-money ratio, µ, and a given reserve requirement, φ,
the set of sustainable government deﬁcits is smaller when interest is paid on reserves. This is not
surprising given that the total resources of the economy are the same in both economies and by
paying interest on reserves, there are fewer resources available to sustain larger government deﬁcits.
In addition, one can compared the levels of inﬂation between the two economies.














while for the interest-on-reserves economy it is given by equation (15). The following lemma states
as u ﬃcient condition under which the return on real balances in the interest economy is greater
than in the corresponding no-interest economy.
Lemma 4 Let ˆ z be the value of real balances such that S−1 (ˆ z)=1 .































The proof of this lemma follows from Assumption A.2 and a comparison of equations (15) and (23).
In part (i), the rate of return on real balances, for a given level of balances, is always larger in the
non-interest bearing economy. Thus, at the high real balances steady state, inﬂation (the inverse
of the return on money) will be higher in the interest-on-reserves economy. This is as expected
because the seigniorage tax base is smaller in this economy too. In fact, in all three cases (parts
(i) — (iii)) the economy with the lower level of real balances (when comparing high or low balance
steady states across economies) always has the higher rate of inﬂation.21
21In parts (i) and (iii) it is not possible to compare the low or high real balance equilibria respectively. For example,
16It is also possible, in steady state, to compare price level indeterminacy, volatility, and welfare
between the economies with and without payment of interest of reserves.
4.2 Indeterminacy and Equilibrium
One of Friedman’s primary concerns was eliminating price level indeterminacy and volatility. He
felt that paying interest on reserves (and potentially combining it with a 100% reserve requirement)
would achieve that goal. As is obvious from Figures 3 - 5, paying interest on reserves in the presence
of a constant per capita government deﬁcit at best maintains the level of price indeterminacy
(in steady state) and at worst increases the indeterminacy when compared to an economy where
reserves do not earn interest. The exact impact will depend on whether the lower bound on the
interest rate paid on bonds is binding in equation (16).





´ ≤ z− (NI).
In this case, the lower bound on real money balances does not bind in either the non-interest
economy or the economy with interest payments on reserves. As is obvious from Figure 3, the
number of steady state equilibria is equal in the two economies and thus interest payments on
reserves do not impact indeterminacy of equilibria.







When this second case obtains, the introduction of interest payments on reserves actually in-
crease the indeterminacy as depicted in Figure 4. This result follows from the fact that in the non-
interest economy, the government is attempting to ﬁnance its deﬁc i tw i t ham i xo fm o r e( b o n d s )o r
less (money) expensive ﬁnancing options. This can be achieved either by means of a large tax base
and small tax or vice versa. However, the government faces a lower bound on the return it can
oﬀer on bonds (due to the presence of the storage technology), while still insuring that individuals





pt+1 (z) for all z. However, it is also true that z
−(NI) <z
−, and the returns
















17hold money and bonds. This, in turn, results in a minimum level of the seigniorage tax base that
must be maintained so that the ﬁxed deﬁcit, g, can be ﬁnanced. However, in this case the steady
state level of real balances is less than minimum level of the base needed to insure all assets are
held, and consequently is not a viable level of real balances.
This is not the case when interest is paid on reserves because the range of tax base options is
limited by the fact that the return on the less expensive ﬁnancing option, money, is linked to the
return on the more expensive ﬁnancing option, bonds. Because the return on bonds and money are
linked, this reduces the government’s ability to choose the more or less expensive options to ﬁnance
their deﬁcit by limiting the trade-oﬀ between a large tax base or a large tax rate. Consequently,
the small monetary balances equilibrium represented by z− (NI) is not an option in the interest
economy, while z− is suﬃciently large to be consistent with a binding reserve requirement and
positive money and bond holdings.







As in the ﬁrst case above, the number of steady state equilibria consistent with equation (16) are
the same in both economies: a unique steady state equilibria. In this case, there is no indeterminacy
regardless of whether interest is paid on reserves. Thus, it is either the case that paying interest on
reserves does not aﬀect the number of steady state equilibria and indeterminacy in the economy, or
it increases the number of steady state equilibria and raise the level of indeterminacy — the opposite
of what Friedman had envisioned.22
4.3 Volatility and Welfare
An examination of Figures 3-5 and the results of the previous section also bear upon the amount
of volatility observed in the respective economies and the welfare implications of paying interest on
reserves. Given Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2), which require that savings be a strictly increasing
function of the rate of return on savings, it is straightforward to show that higher real money
balances are Pareto superior to lower real balances. In addition, volatility will be deﬁned as the
22This result is consistent with Sargent and Wallace (1985) and runs counter to Smith (1991). The diﬀerence
between Smith (1991) and this paper is that the real return to holding money balance in terms of date t +1is not
ﬁxed to the return on storage and the government must ﬁnance a deﬁcit. If both of these conditions did not exist,
the results of this paper would be consistent with those of Smith (1991).
18variance over steady state equilibria. We now proceed to examine volatility and welfare under the
following three conditions.
Case 6: In this case, there exist two steady state equilibria in both the interest bearing and non-
interest economies, as depicted in Figure 3. With respect to volatility, there will be less volatility
in the case where interest is paid on reserves. This results from the fact that by tying the rate of
return on money balances to the real return on savings, the government’s hands are tied regarding
its ability to make a trade-oﬀ between a larger seigniorage tax base and the seigniorage tax rate.
Consequently the range of real money balances which can sustain the per capital deﬁcit g, is smaller
when interest is paid on reserves. Thus, in this case interest payments have the desired impact of
reducing economic volatility.
As for the welfare implications of paying interest on reserves, that depends on whether the
high or low real money balance equilibria are compared. A comparison of low real money balance
equilibria yields z− (NI) <z −. Consequently, welfare in the interest paying economy will be greater
than when interest is not paid on reserves. In contrast, in the high real money balance equilibria,
z+ <z + (NI) holds and welfare is decreased with the imposition of a requirement to pay interest
on reserves. Consistent with Freeman and Haslag (1996), if part (a) of Lemma 3 holds, then the
welfare loss associated with paying interest of reserves can be oﬀset by an appropriate expansionary
open mark operation (i.e. a decline in µ).
Case 7: In this case there exist two steady state equilibria in the interest bearing economy and
only one in the non-interest economy, as depicted in Figure 4. As a consequence, paying interest
on reserves both reduces welfare unambiguously and also increases volatility dramatically. The
explanation as to why, is identical to that for the additional price indeterminacy observed in this
case. Namely, because the range of real money balances which are consistent with equilibria is
smaller, it is less likely that the lower bound for the range of returns on savings will be binding. As
a result, it is more likely that multiple equilibria will exist. Consequently, there exists indeterminacy
and volatility (associated with the indeterminacy) that are not present when a unique equilibria
exists (as in the non-interest economy). In addition, since z− <z + <z + (NI) holds, the unique
equilibrium associate with the non-interest economy is strictly better, in terms of welfare, than
either steady state equilibrium which might prevail in the interest bearing economy.
Case 8: In this case there exist a unique, high real money balance equilibrium in both the
interest bearing and non-interest economies, as depicted in Figure 5. Since there exists a unique
19equilibrium in both economies, there does not exist any volatility in either economy and paying
interest on reserves neither helps nor hurts the economy in terms of reducing volatility. From a
welfare perspective, since z+ <z + (NI) holds, welfare is worsened as a result of interest payments
on reserves. This decline in welfare results from the fact that tying the rate of return on money
balances and bonds together, reduces the government’s freedom to choose a larger seigniorage tax
base and accompanying smaller tax rate to ﬁnance its deﬁcit. This restriction in the range of tax
bases which can support a deﬁcit of a given side is a doubled edged sword. It reduced the volatility
in the case 6 economy described above, but in this case the same smaller tax base (as compared
to a non-interest bearing economy) also reduces the beneﬁts consumers might gain from having a
smaller seigniorage tax.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Over the past few years, Congress has indicated an increased willingness to pass legislation allowing
the Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserves and the likelihood of approval in the next few years is
high. Although it will have taken over half a century since Milton Friedman ﬁrst made his proposal
for interest payments to become a reality, the likely impact on the economy is still not completely
understood. Friedman’s motivation for his proposal was to eliminate price level indeterminacy and
volatility and thereby improve economic well-being. Although several authors have examined the
impact of paying interest on reserves on these issues, their models omitted two important issues:
equating the return on reserves to similar short-term assets and the impact of government deﬁcit
ﬁnancing.
This paper has attempted to re-examine those issues of concern to Friedman in the context of
a model where the rate of return on reserves equals that of government securities and where the
government ﬁnances an after-tax deﬁcit via debt and seigniorage. The model used is a standard
three asset model (storage, bonds and money) where the return to money is dominated by the
return on other assets. Storage must be intermediated and is subject to a reserve requirement,
where the return on reserves is equated to the return on bonds. Finally, the government must
ﬁnance an after-tax deﬁcit, in addition to paying interest on bonds and reserves. This environment
is similar to the previous models that studied this issue, although in my model the issue of how to
ﬁnance interest payments is diﬀerent.
I am able to demonstrate four basic results. First, the level of indeterminacy is equal to or greater
20than the level when interest is not paid on reserves. Second, when the level of indeterminacy is the
same in the two economies, then economic volatility is reduced with the introduction of interest
payments. However, when greater indeterminacy in the interest-on-reserves economy exists , then
there also exists greater volatility. Third, when the level of indeterminacy is the same in the two
economies, then the equilibrium associated with low real money balances in the interest economy
is welfare improving compared to the non-interest economy. The reverse is true at the high real
money balance equilibrium. In this latter case, an appropriate expansionary open market operation
can oﬀset the welfare losses associated with interest payments on reserves. Finally, under a narrow
set of conditions, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic may apply to at most one of the steady state
equilibrium. Some of these results run counter to what Friedman had envisioned and also to
previous ﬁndings.
The key to these results is two-fold. First, by not pegging the return on reserves to the asset with
the highest real return, the model allows for multiple equilibria (unlike for example Smith (1991)
and Freeman and Haslag (1996) where equating the returns on storage and reserves eliminates
indeterminacies). Second, by allowing for a government deﬁcit, how that deﬁcit is ﬁnanced aﬀects
the overall impact of interest payments on the economy. When the return on reserves is linked to
the return on bonds, this limits the options available to the government in terms of how it ﬁnances
its deﬁcit. The trade-oﬀ between higher cost funding (bonds) and lower cost funding (money) is
diminished, as is the government’s ability to make a trade-oﬀ between a large tax base and a high
tax rate. This reduces the set of real money balances which can support a given deﬁcit while still
making bonds an attractive investment option.
There is scope for extensions to this current work. The most obvious one would be to analyze the
dynamics of the economy. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) demonstrated that under certain conditions
a unique steady state equilibrium would always obtain. It would be interesting to derive those
conditions under which a unique steady state equilibrium would obtain in an economy where interest
is paid on reserves. In addition, it would be useful to know whether the economy would naturally
gravitate to one or the other of the steady state equilibria.
21AP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
a) That H (z,µ,φ,R)=0iﬀ z =0or z = z† follows immediately from the deﬁnition of H (z,µ,φ,d),
























i >S −1 (0).
However, Assumption (A.1).implies that S−1(0) < min{1,φR} holds and thus this equation is
satisﬁed.















































(1 − φ)S−1 (0)
> 0.

























< 0 <H 1 (0,µ,φ,R).
B Proof of Lemma 2
From the deﬁnition of z†, the claim follows if
φR <
h



























22The left-hand inequality in equation (B.1) follows from Assumption (A.4). The right-hand inequal-
ity is implied by R>1.













































































If this equation holds, then H1 (z+,µ,φ,R) < 0 implies that H2 (z+,µ,φ,R) < 0 h o l d sa sw e l l .
However, equation (C.2) holds iﬀ
φR > [1 + φ(1 − R)]S−1.
For 1+φ(1 − R) < 0, this will obviously hold. In addition, if 1+φ(1 − R) > 0 and φR > 1, then
by equation (16) this will also always hold. If neither of these is the case, then given Assumptions
(A.1) and (A.2), a suﬃcient condition to guarantee the above is





It then follows from equation (20) that ∂z+ /∂µ < 0.
23D Proof of Proposition 1





















































































∂µ has the same sign as H1. However, given
Assumption (A.2), if φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] >S −1 ¡
z†¢








∂µ < 0 when H1 < 0 and conversely.
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